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ABSTRACT
Since the 1980's, "radical" compositionists concerned

with the politicization of the writing classroom have made
use of the work of Jurgen Habermas, whose theories of

communication within an ideal speech situation--that is,
the public sphere--have been taken up at different times in
the field. Composition appropriated Habermasian theory, it
appears, in order to provide a theoretical background for

their discussions of consensus and intersubjectivity—

particularly in collaborative learning--and their
examination of the social motives that drive dominant

discourses.
However, there are problems with Habermas. Indeed, his
attempt to continue the Enlightenment project with his

focus on Universal Pragmatics does not fit neatly into the

landscape of postmodern composition studies. Consequently,
this thesis looks at Habermasian notions of "emancipatory
discourse" based on "universal structures" through the lens

of Habermas's "debate" with postmodern philosopher Michel
Foucault.

Why Foucault? In their efforts to make Habermas "work"

for composition studies, composition scholars often make

amendments to their discussions by incorporating what look
iii

suspiciously like Foucauldian principles. This thesis thus

sheds light on (1) the extent to which composition has
fallen short in its efforts to examine Habermasian

discourse in the public sphere/politicized classroom; and
(2) whether, through a careful and explicit exploration of

the Habermas/Foucault debate and the competing concepts of
discourse contained therein, we might make use of those
concepts in the politicized classroom to inform student
writing in the public sphere.

iv
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION-

In Moving Beyond Academic Discourse: Composition

Studies and the Public Sphere (2002), Christian Weisser
reveals how,

radical theories in composition studies .

.

.

have recently begun to conceive of the public
sphere as ... a useful metaphor for how we

might envision writing classrooms,

(xiii)

By employing the term "radical" in reference to composition

studies, Weisser refers largely to composition's interest
-in how ideological beliefs and power shape social,

cultural, and political attitudes. Weisser goes on to
demonstrate how these "radical" compositionists are

interested in writing instruction that has "real political

and social ramifications" (57); as a result, the writing
classroom becomes overtly politicized and can be viewed as

a microcosm of the public sphere.

While discussing "radical composition's" interest in

the public sphere, Weisser focuses much of his attention to
the social/critical theorist Jurgen Habermas, whose
theories of communication in an ideal speech situation—
1

within the public sphere--were taken up by compositionists
in the 1980s and 1990s. Compositionists appropriated

Habermasian theory, it appears, in order to provide a
theoretical background for their discussions of consensus

and intersubjectivity in collaborative learning, their
interests in the public sphere, and their examination of

the social motives that drive dominant discourses.
However, composition's focus on Habermas's
continuation of the Enlightenment project which attempts to
find universality in reasoned and consensual communication

—thus presenting an idealized dialogic space—has proved
troubling for some. Indeed, in her essay "Paralogy,

Externalism, and Competence: Exploring Habermas through

Thomas Kent," Jacqueline Rhodes writes "compositionists
have grappled (and only sporadically) with [Habermas's]

ideas without much success" (1). The problem, perhaps,
stems from the complexity of Habermas's theories, or more

importantly, from the fact that his attempt to continue the
Enlightenment project with his focus on Universal

Pragmatics does not fit neatly into the landscape of
postmodern composition studies (Rhodes 5).
By introducing Habermasian theory into a principally

postmodern discipline, compositionists' efforts seem
2

somewhat misguided; for, with his version of the

Enlightenment project and its potential for universality in
discourse, Habermas clearly proposes the continuation of

modernity. Yet, compositionists' discussions of Habermas

contradictorily hinge on the postmodern idea that discourse
and knowledge are context-specific and inextricably fused
with the dynamics of power. In the postmodern view,

discourse is not objective or indicative of absolute
"truths"; the nuances of discourse are by no means

universal. Thus, composition's use of Habermas presents us
with an interesting inconsistency for Habermas's modernist
activity sets up criteria of rational discourse that are

context-transcending (Ashenden and Owen 13). In short, this

inconsistency presents us with a view of the
dissimilarities between modern and postmodern theories of

discourse.
Using Rhodes's assessment of composition's somewhat

incongruous appropriation of Habermasian theory as a
springboard, this thesis investigates the work of
compositionists Patricia Roberts, John Trimbur, and Irene

Ward, each of whom discuss Habermas's work in terms of the
potential of his version of emancipatory discourse. In my

investigation, I explore what I call composition's

3

"Habermasian dileinma"--the contradiction implied in

extending Habermasian, and therefore modernist, approaches

into a principally postmodern discipline-through the lens

of his "debate" with postmodern philosopher Michel

Foucault, who strongly critiqued Habermasian universalism.
Why Foucault? As I see it, in their efforts to make
Habermas "work" for composition studies, scholars often
make amendments to their discussions of Habermas by

incorporating what look suspiciously like Foucauldian

principles. Foucauldian theory, more often than not,

complements composition's postmodern leanings for it is

wholly concerned with the inextricable relationship between
power, knowledge, and discourse.

What then, can the Habermas/Foucault debate offer
politicized composition studies? Firstly, this thesis sheds
light on the extent to which compositionists, perhaps
unconsciously, amend their examination of Habermasian

discourse with Foucauldian insight in the public

sphere/politicized classroom. Accordingly, I suggest that a
study of the Habermas/Foucault debate foregrounds the sort

of contradictions I find in composition's use of Habermas;

indeed, a study of the debate explicitly highlights many of
the inconsistencies between modern and postmodern theories
4

of discourse which can be openly explored in a politicized
classroom.

Secondly, bearing the politicized classroom in mind, I
analyze, through a careful exploration of the

Habermas/Foucault debate and their competing concepts of
discourse, how their theories might be used in composition

studies, as Bernd Stahl puts it, "to complement each other,

despite their fundamental differences" (4329). Indeed,
following Bent Flyvbjerg, I show that an explicitly stated,
"comparative analysis of the central ideas of Habermas and
Foucault as they pertain to democracy and civil society"

(210) offers students the opportunity to examine differing ■
methods of critique in a politicized classroom; certainly,

these critiques foreground differing perspectives—and the

role power plays--on the nature of "truth" and "reason" in
knowledge and discourse. Students can then utilize these

critiques to assess their own vantage point when addressing

social issues of their own choosing.
Finally, I indicate that in order to find a point of

complementarity between Habermas and Foucault, the idea of
the idealized speech situation must ultimately be dropped.

For it is my contention that despite Habermas's efforts to

prescribe conditions for consensus, the dynamics of power
5

are ever-present. I should add that my attempt to partner
Habermasian and Foucauldian theory differs from
composition's previous use of Habermas because it points

out that composition's amendments to Habermasian theory are

distinctly Foucauldian, whereas the "Foucault-like" nature
of my chosen compositionists' "amendments" is merely
implied.

While their debate was never a formal, public one,
Habermas and Foucault both addressed communication in terms
of Enlightenment ideals and responded prolifically to each
other's work. To illustrate the debate's importance, Scott
Moore offers the following in his introduction to a recent

graduate seminar; he states:

At stake is the very nature of Reason, the form
and substance of Truth, the possibility of
History, and the perpetuation of Modernity or the

dawning of a new Postmodern Age. Perhaps the
issues at stake are best articulated by Foucault

himself. Responding to a critique by a disciple
of Habermas, Foucault writes "I think that the

central issue of philosophy and critical thought
since the eighteenth century, has been, still is,
and will, I hope, remain the question, what is
6

this Reason that we use? What are its historical
effects? What are its limits, and what are its

dangers?" (Par. 2-3)
Like Foucault, "reason" is Habermas's central concern;
certainly, the driving force of his theory of communication

rests on his notion of rationality, or rather,
"intersubjective agreement" which is "rational, negotiated

assent among autonomous, responsible individuals" (Grady
and Wells 1). He looks at how rationality can be

characterized in universal terms based on the validity
claims of participants in what he terms an ideal speech

situation. As Samantha Ashenden and David Owen posit in

Foucault Contra Habermas, since the 1971 publication of
Knowledge and Human Interests,

The main thrust of [Habermas's] work has been
concerned with redeeming the possibility of an
emancipatory form of knowledge through the

project of universal pragmatics by rendering
plausible his theory of communicative action and

rationality.

(3)

I intend to discuss the nature of Universal Pragmatics

later in this chapter but, for now, I venture that both
Foucault and Habermas are wholly engaged in the nature of

7

reason/rationality and its effects on emancipatory
practices in civil democracy. Yet, as I will determine,

both differ radically in their critiques. Habermasian
notions of universal ideals in communication, which aim at
rational consensus between equal and autonomous members of

a speech situation, lie in stark contrast to what Flyvbjerg
terms "Foucauldian power analytics" (210). For Foucault,

discourses of reason are always laced with power because
power is instrumental in the establishment of knowledge
within discourse; specifically, power and knowledge are

inextricable (Foss, Foss, and Trapp 351). Thus, as Ashenden

and Owen point out, "the crux of Foucauldian criticism is
skepticism towards the context transcending power of

critical reflection, its moment of unconditionality"

(13)

because, for Foucault, reason is actually restricted to
what those in power consider reasonable. Consequently, for
Foucault, a universal approach to consensus is problematic.

Flyvbjerg--channeling Foucault--states: "we should operate

as if universals do not exist.
are said to exist,

[In fact], where universals

[they] must be questioned" (222).

Instead, Foucault posits that domination in public

discourse must be impaired not by consensual procedures

8

which assume the absence of power but by examinations of

the exercise of power and rhetoric . (216).
In what seems like a Foucauldian move, "radical

compositionists," according to Weisser, have "attempted to
more fully account for the relationship between power and
discourse" (25). Yet, the compositionists Weisser considers

have adopted Habermasian theory to inform their pedagogy,

despite its lack of acknowledgement of the power dynamics
inherent in discourses. At first glance, Habermasian theory
seems appropriate to introduce into the field of radical

composition since his ideas of communicative rationality
recommend non-coercive consensual debate whereby
participants attempt to overcome their personal

subjectivities. In short, participants engage in
intersubjective and rational debate. Habermas's theory thus

informs a version of the composition classroom which (a)

models itself on the Habermasian democratic process and (b)
gives us an ideal by which to measure our own

investigations into ideological/political processes.

However, Foucault might suggest that when aiming for
consensus through rationalized debate, one must first

scrutinize what is "rational." One must ask whether the
participants in a politicized classroom should be guided by
9

abstract systems of theoretical thinking or, perhaps, via

examinations of resistance and struggle in real, social,
and historically grounded contexts.
I suggest Foucault offers us an alternative

conception of communication within the public

sphere/politicized classroom based on his focus on what

Flyvbjerg deems realpolitik, and his seemingly (although he
denied affiliation) postmodern approach to a theory of
discourse. For, as Flyvbjerg states,

Whereas Habermas approaches regulation [of
dominance] from a universalistic theory of
discourse, Foucault seeks out a genealogical
understanding of actual power relations in

specific contexts.

(223)

It would seem, therefore, that Foucault's approach would
intrigue radical compositionists' keen interest in the

politicized classroom, especially with its postmodern

perception of the classroom/public sphere as a "contested,
historically textured, multilayered, and sometimes

contradictory site" (Weisser xiii).
Consequently, with Weisser's (among others) recent

interfest in the politicization of the writing classroom in

mind, I suggest the Habermas/Foucault debate has much to
10

offer composition studies. Indeed, as stated earlier, I

intend to show how Foucault's approach might be used as a

complement to Habermas in order to provide a theoretical

background for practical applications in the politicized
writing classroom. Certainly, a fully articulated
description of the Habermas/Foucault debate offers students

an inroad into modernist and postmodernist thought and,
further, sets the stage for students to scrutinize the

power relations inherent in the discourses that shape their
lives.

Before I discuss the implications of this debate for
radical composition, I attempt to describe the debate more

fully, keeping in mind its importance to composition
studies, and the work of the compositionists I single out
in Chapter Two. I must stress, however, that the length and
breadth of Foucauldian and Habermasian scholarship is so

daunting that any approach to it I offer will be tainted by

my own re-interpretation of the debate which earnestly
searches for an application to radical composition studies.

However, it seems, I am in good company. According to Foss,
Foss, and Trapp in Contemporary Perspectives on Rhetoric,

Habermas himself has concluded that words, spoken or

published, "have an effect on readers, and listeners at the
11

moment of their reception which the author cannot revoke or

withdraw" (237).
The remainder of this chapter provides a brief

background on the ideas of Habermas and Foucault that
constitute an overview of the "debate," focusing on the

fundamental opposition between the two philosophers' ideas
on language in public contexts. In Chapter Two, I

investigate the past use of Habermasian theory within
composition studies, including composition's attempts to
rehabilitate Habermas through an. unvoiced (or even
unconscious) reliance on Foucault. Finally, Chapter Three

explores what use composition might make of a fully
articulated, deliberate use of the debate between Habermas

and Foucault—including an attempt to reconcile them—in a

politicized classroom.

Jurgen Habermas
When asked in a recent interview to pinpoint the

dominant themes in his life's work, Habermas stated, "I
suppose Democracy is at least one major issue in my work if
I look back" (Habermasian Reflections') . Having spent a

childhood exposed to the horrors of the Nazi regime,

Habermas explains democracy as "the obvious alternative to
12

the regime under which I had been living" (Reflections).
Consequently, Habermas describes his ideas on democracy as

the "thread running through my work at the beginning to
what I am presently interested in" (Reflections).

Habermasian theories of democracy extend from a

diverse array of philosophical, social, and political
thought. Yet, to fully understand them, one must be

familiar with the theories of those who have influenced his
ideas. Becoming familiar with Habermas's reading list,

however, is no mean feat. In the "The Technical, the
Practical, and the Emancipatory: A Habermasian View of
Composition Pedagogy," John Aber writes:

Part of the difficulty may lie in the breadth of

Habermas's scholarship. His densely written books

are stuffed with an encyclopedic range of

references and illusions.

Many of us who studied

rhetoric and composition in graduate schools are
simply not conversant with the nineteenth century

German philosophical tradition that underpins
Habermas's work.

(124)

Habermas's influences do not only entail a vast knowledge

of German philosophy. Besides the philosophies of Kant,
particular), Schelling, and others, Habermasian theory

13

(in

grounds itself in the intellectual theories of The
Frankfurt School.

As one of the central surviving theorists to emerge
from the Frankfurt Institute—known for its focus on social

philosophy--Habermas draws much from Critical Theory.

Critical Theory concerns itself' with the idea, as Foss,
Foss, and Trapp put it, that "society can be experienced as

an arrangement of ideas that invite rational critique,"
(246), and expounds three fundamental tenets. Firstly, for
emancipation from domination and ideology, society must

move in a rational direction. We must remember, however,
that as rationality is progressive, we must be aware of the
contradictions inherent in it. That is, we must have the

ability to see irrationality. For instance, societal
participants must be aware of technical rationality which

often comes at the expense of human concerns (246).

Secondly, calling for "the marriage of theory and
practice," Critical Theorists attempt to relate their
theories to current social concerns. Events in contemporary

society inform Critical Theory, as Critical Theory so too
attempts to inform societal consciousness (247) . Finally,

Critical Theory strives to critique the belief systems that
shape ideology (247). Critical Theory defines ideology as a

14

"system of irrational beliefs that maintain legitimacy

despite the fact that it cannot be validated if subjected
to rational discourse" (247). From examining briefly these
three tenets we will later see how Critical Theory features

largely in Habermas's theory of communication, which aims
to keep a watchful eye on conditions of domination.
In addition to German philosophy and The Frankfurt

School, Habermas is also influenced by Marxism. This is not
surprising since, as Foss, Foss, and Trapp point out,
Marxism "was central to the Frankfurt School at the time

Habermas studied there" (237). However, Habermas offers a
"'reconstruction of Marxism', by which he means 'taking a
theory apart and putting it back together'" (237). Eung-Jun

Min claims that this theoretical reconstruction strategy

becomes manifest in Habermas's "reformulation of historical
materialism" which features "greater emphasis on

communication and culture" (1). Traditionally, historical
materialism focuses on societal development and change via
the analysis of its economic production. However, Min
states that Habermas's reformulation is important because

it "emphasizes social conditions affecting the legitimacy
of various cultural forms," (1) in particular, in the way

we communicate. Habermas's interest in human communication
15

is crucial because, as Nancy Love writes, "it is social
interaction that is our distinctively human capacity" (49).
Furthermore, underlying our ability to interact are certain

intersubjective norms that facilitate our interactions
(49); It is the recognition of rules and norms in human

communication that was to become the basis for Habermas's
communicative theory.

It should be no surprise, therefore, to discover that

Habermas was also influenced largely by the Speech Act
Theory of J. L. Austin and John Searle. In his 1965 article
"What is a Speech Act?" Searle states that the production

of the sentence under certain conditions constitutes an

illocutionary act and these are necessarily rule governed.
In his discussion of "Rules," Searle later states:
In recent years, there has been in the philosophy
of language considerable discussion involving the

notion of rules for the use of expressions . .

.

one disquieting feature of such discussions is
that no such philosopher, to my knowledge at

least, has ever anything like an adequate
formulation of the rules for the use of even one
expression.

(255)

16

Following the work of Austin and Searle, it is clear that

Habermas takes up this gauntlet. Furthermore, by laying out

a complex theory of the rules that govern communicative
acts, Habermas makes a case for the continuation of

modernity.
Habermas's Modernism; Reason in the Public Sphere

In the article "Jurgen Habermas: Theologian of Talk,"
which discusses Habermas's relationship to modernity,

Stephen Mitchell writes "The question is whether Justice
exists and Reason can benefit society.

It's postmodern to

say no, but Jurgen Habermas disagrees" (par. 1). Min,
echoing Mitchell, states:
Postmodernism is becoming the dominant and

political form of our epoch with systematic
excesses and provocations.

But not everyone

rejects the modernist project.

Most famously,

Habermas has called for the completion of the

project of modernity, a project whose roots lie
in the Enlightenment notion of rationality.

(11)

In his re-imagining of Enlightenment rationality, Habermas
claims to find the genesis of a theoretical approach which

aims to smooth out the social imbalances in contemporary

society (Foss, Foss, and Trapp 238). The Enlightenment's

17

significance to Habermas lies in his belief that "it gave
birth to a particular conception of reason in the public

sphere (238); he would thus salvage this version of reason
to construct his own theory of communication. Simply put,

the Enlightenment public sphere offered a place where
individuals from the private realm could get together in
the public realm (coffee houses, salons, and publishing

houses) to form public opinion which was not subject to
political, that is, monarchal, authority (239).
Habermas claims his idea of reasoned debate in the
public sphere differs somewhat from the positivistic
rationality of the Enlightenment; that is, the idea that

the only valid knowledge is that which is "empirically
testable," "value free," and "disinterested" (Grady and
Wells 34). For Habermas, debate in the sphere rests on his

version of what is rational:

We call someone rational not only if he is able

to put forward an assertion and, when criticized,
to provide grounds for it by pointing to the

appropriate evidence, but also if he is following
an established norm and is able, when criticized,

to justify his action by explicating the

situation in light of legitimate expectations.
18

We even call someone rational if he makes known a

desire or an intention . .

. and is then able to

reassure critics in regard to the revealed

experience by drawing practical consequences from
it and behaving consistently thereafter,

(qtd. in

Ashenden and Owen 4)

Understanding Habermas's vision of rationality in the
public sphere in twentieth and twenty-first century terms

is crucial because, as Foss, Foss, and Trapp put it, his
vision guarantees "every citizen the right of access to
discussion in the public sphere by virtue of the abstract

right of humanness" (239). In the public sphere, individual

freedom is essential to the process of consensus. Habermas
says:

The degree of legal equality should be achieved

which will allow at the same time the greatest
possible measure of individualism, and this means

for individuals to shape their own lives . .
Freedom . .

.

. can only be thought in connection

with a network of interpersonal relationships,
and this means in the context of the

communicative structures of a community, which

ensures that the freedom of some is not achieved
19

at the cost of the freedom of others,

(qtd. in

Foss, Foss, and Trap 233)
Thus, Habermas insists that reasoned communication within

the public sphere does not allow for coercion or domination
of others, thus, individual subjects reach consensus in the

public sphere intersubjectively. Habermasian

intersubjectivity is typified by participants engaging in
communicative practices that emphasize "shared knowledge,

mutual trust, and accord with one another" (Habermas qtd.
in Roberts, par. 20).

While critics have labeled these ideas utopian,
Habermas insists his notion of intersubjectivity has become
unrealistic because of human dependence on material systems
and structures (Foss, Foss, and Trapp 243). For example,

because of what he terms "colonization," Habermas posits

that humankind has less need to achieve consensus through
communication because disputes can be resolved by adhering

to sets of formal laws and regulations put in place by

those in power (244). By relying on these structures,
personal autonomy becomes subordinate to the rules and

regulations which attempt to create efficient systems yet
actually decrease the potential of consensus—through
intersubjective agreement—in what Habermas calls "The

20

Lifeworld"; that is, the "immediate milieu of the social
actor" (242) .

Despite humankind's inability to divorce itself from
systems that undermine the potential of consensual
communication, Habermas insists that public debate is
crucial for democracy. He further claims that the perfect

conditions for equal, rational debate are possible in what
he terms the ideal speech situation. The ideal speech

situation rests on Habermas's assertion that "conditions of
rational argumentation [can] operate critically as a

regulative ideal immanent in all speech act offers,"

(Ashenden and Owen 5). Here Habermas makes his most
controversial claim. He insists that despite our capacity

to recognize the presuppositions of context-bound speech

acts, "the validity of these presuppositions is not context

bound" (5). Consequently, he claims "The transcendental
moment of universal validity bursts every provinciality
asunder" (qtd. in Ashenden and Owen 5). In the following

section, I will explain what Habermas means by the validity

of speech acts via what he terms "Universal Pragmatics."

The Ideal Speech Situation: Universal Pragmatics
Habermas attempts his continuation of modernity by

looking at the way humans use language.
21

As he reveals to

Mitchell, "in our everyday knowledge of how language is
properly used, we find a common ground among all creatures

with a human face" (par. 32). Following Austin and Searle's
Speech Act Theory, Habermas claims to satisfy modernity's
quest for universalism by finding common ground in language
structures. Thus, emancipatory discourse might develop from

Habermas's ideas of language being "properly used"

(Mitchell, par. 32).
If, in Habermasian terms, the public sphere offers a
place where one might achieve the ideal speech situation,

then this situation must be a place where participants
attempt communicative competence by following certain rules
during an interaction; Habermas calls these rules

"Universal Pragmatics." In Addressing Postmodernity,
Barbara Biesecker addresses the implications of Universal
Pragmatics. She states that following Speech Act Theory and

taking an utterance or statement as the basic unit of

speech for analysis (rather than the sentence), Habermas
asserts that a set of relations become functional during an
act of communication:
The first relation is between that which is

stated and an extra linguistic reality of
phenomena to which the statement refers; the

22

second is between that which is stated and the

speakers own intentional experiences; and the
third is between that which is stated and the
intersubjectively established values and norms
that.constitute the shared lifeworld.

(78)

In short, embedded within the framework of these relations

is a specific goal-directed process aimed at mutual
understanding. Indeed, within human communication, Habermas

claims, in Theory and Practice, "the telos of reaching an
understanding is already inherent" (17). Of course,
communication is always open for distortion; for instance,

a speaker might not always speak truthfully, s/he might not
always be forthright, and so on. However, as Habermas
reveals in Communication and the Evolution of Society, in a
successful act of communication, competent communicators

adhere to the above stated set of relations in the

following ways:
1. by using the propositional sentence that will

fulfill the presuppositions of both addressor
and addressee.
2. by expressing intent in a way that it is

understood by both addressor and addressee

(according to the second relation).
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3. by configuring the expression so it conforms to

the discursive expectations of the
addressor/addressee's shared identification,
(qtd. in Rhodes 4)

These rules of communicative competence constitute
Habermas's validity claims. Validity claims are redeemable
and indicate an interlocutor's ability to communicate in a

specific way aimed at "a shared understanding of truth,
rightness, and sincerity" (3).

In an act of communication, then, advancing these
claims will assist the speaker in communicating in a way

that, as Hugh H. Grady and Susan Wells put it, is "socially

situated, open to reflection, and that refuses to value one

form of discourse--scientific, persuasive, or expressive—
at the expense of others" (36). In short, Habermas's vision

of communicative competence, or rather his discourse

ethics, posits conditions for discourse from which
interlocutors can recognize universally valid norms. Most

importantly, these conditions ensure that the interests of
all participants are met (Cavalier and Ess, par. 16).
As Grady and Wells indicate, Habermas's ideal speech

situation is not characteristic of human communication.
Certainly, he recognizes that validity claims do not
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necessarily constitute the normal characteristics of day to
day communication (36). Indeed, we have all experienced
such speech situations whereby the best interests of all

the participants are not taken into account. However, Grady
and Wells indicate Habermas's explicit instruction that

validity claims "are logically necessary qualities of
speech directed at understanding" (36). Thus, to further

understanding and to enable rational consensus, validity

claims implicit in communication must be redeemable. That

is, validity claims must be "supportable by rational
argumentation, open to questioning of assumption, addressed

by speakers free from inequality, coercion, and domination"

(36).

Certainly, in an ideal speech situation, a

participant's rationality can be challenged if it appears

to be deceptive or forcefully imposing an opinion at the

expense of silencing of others (36).
It is vital to remember for this project, as Maeve
Cook states, that communicative competence "makes us aware
that as speakers and hearers, there are certain things we
must—as a matter of necessity--always already have

presupposed if communication is to be successful" (3). For

Habermas, these presuppositions can constitute "universal
competencies" inherent in the day to day linguistic
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practices of communicators engaged in the effort of mutual

understanding (3). It is important to note that Habermas

claims his project is context dependent; that is, "what is
right and true in given communicative process is determined
solely by the participants in that process" (Flyvbjerg

214). Nevertheless, he maintains that the universal
structures implied by universal pragmatics do underlie his

idea of rational communication, and with this theory, he
projects the continuation of modernity. However, even by
positing universal rules in a context dependent speech

situation, Habermas neglects one very important factor: the
issue of power. Consequently, as Flyvbjerg announces "Here

we turn to the work of Michel Foucault" (219) .

Michel Foucault
Unlike Habermas, Foucault seems extremely wary of a

universalizing theory that transcends contextual

boundaries. As I have indicated, Habermas insists upon a
universalizing theory of discourse which holds up the
yardstick against which we might measure ethical normative

standards based on his notion of the ideal speech situation

(and the inherent-ness of presuppositions in the advancing
of validity claims.) Alternatively, Foucault indicates that
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we need to study the contextual elements of language from a
historical viewpoint in order to unearth the power
relations in discourses. That is, we should scrutinize

normative standards from a historical perspective because

the projection of normative standards according to a
universalizing theory can result in the privileging of one
discourse over another.

Paul Rainbow highlights Foucault's suspicion of
universal truths in his introduction to The Foucault
Reader, claiming "He doesn't refute them; instead his

consistent response is to historicize grand abstractions"

(4). Therefore, Foucault rejects the notion of a
transcendental "beyond"—that is, the assertion of an

inherent moral ethic in human speech--because, for
Foucault, this morality is a consequence of arbitrary,

historical conditions and power struggles. As a result, he
questions the ethical standards Habermas proposes, despite

Habermas's efforts to sustain a theory of discourse that
cannot be exploited (Flyvbjerg 215).

Foucault's critique—which rests on the notion that
human values and beliefs emerge out of historical, social,
and political "accidents" rather than a historical

progression towards an ideal societal vision—takes what he
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terms first an "archeological" approach (The Birth of the
Clinic [1963], The Order of things [1966],

The Archeology

of Knowledge [1968]) and later, following Nietzsche, a
"genealogical" approach (Discipline and Punish [1975]).

According to Gary Cutting in The Stanford Encyclopedia of
Philosophy,

The premise of the archaeological method is that
systems of thought and knowledge (epistemes or
discursive formations, in Foucault's terminology)

are governed by rules, beyond those of grammar
and logic, that operate beneath the consciousness
of individual subjects and define a system of

conceptual possibilities that determines the
boundaries of thought in a given domain and

period,

(par. 11)

The force of archaeology's criticism lies in the comparison
of different systems of thought during different historical
periods. Foucault reveals the contingency of the "truths"

of those systems. He claims these "truths" are random and
accidental, not conveyers of preexisting meaning (Bizzell

and Herzberg 1432). In fact, in "The Order of Discourse,"

Foucault remarks that "the tendency of Western philosophy

has been the desire to locate truth in something other than
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the discourse itself" (1432). He calls this the Will to

Truth. Foucault points out the Will to Truth by showing
that previous ages had systems of thought very different to

others. He uses Greek history as an example:
There is no doubt that the division is

historically constituted.

For the Greek poets of

the sixth century BC, the true discourse . .

.

the discourse which inspired respect and terror
. .

. the discourse which in prophesying the

future not only announced what was going to
happen but helped make it happen, carrying men's
minds along with it and thus weaving it into the

fabric of destiny. Yet already a century later

the highest truth no longer resided in what
discourse was or did . .

. the true discourse is

no longer precious and desirable, since it is no

longer linked to the exercise of power.

(1462)

The exercise of power, for Foucault, drives The Will to

Truth; indeed, according to Foss, Foss, and Trapp, Foucault
became interested in the effects of power on discourse when

"he came to realize that the treatment of knowledge within
discourse can not be separated from the operation of power"
(351). However, the archeological method, while effective
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in showing that notions of Truth are always dependent on a

particular system of thought and therefore indicative of

systems of power, says little about the transition process
from one system to another, or rather, how systems of
thought are generated. Consequently, Foucault, inspired by

Nietzsche, employed the genealogical method which surfaces
in Discipline and Punish.

On discovering Nietzsche, Foucault says "Nietzsche was
a revelation to me.

I felt there was something quite

different from what I had been taught" (qtd. in Foss, Foss,
and Trapp 341).

Following Nietzsche,

Foucault intended the term "genealogy" to evoke

Nietzsche’s genealogy of morals, particularly

with its suggestion of complex, mundane,

inglorious origins—in no way part of any grand
scheme of progressive history. The point of a
genealogical analysis is to show that a given
system of thought (itself uncovered in its

essential structures by archaeology, which
therefore remains part of Foucault's

historiography) was the result of contingent
turns of history, not the outcome of rationally

inevitable trends.

(Cutting, par. 13)
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When asking how knowledge (and the power structures which

support it) is made possible—or rather "How does it happen

at a given period something could be said and something
else has never been said" (Foss, Foss, and Trapp 347)—
Foucault's genealogical method rejects the search for

origins of thought which indicate ideal or glorious
beginnings (much like Plato's return to the place of ideal
forms). In "Nietzsche, Genealogy, History," Foucault

restates Nietzsche's assertion that "genealogy .

.

.

rejects the meta-historical deployment of ideal
significations and indefinite teleologies" (77). Why?
Foucault answers:

Because it is an attempt to capture the exact
essence of things in their purest possibilities,
and their carefully protected identities . .

.

because this search assumes the existence of
immobile forms that precede the external world of
accident and succession.

(78)

For Nietzsche, and Foucault, there are no ideal beginnings,

for, via the referral to ideal beginnings, systems of

thought are able to dictate who speaks and what can or
cannot be said. Instead of the search for origins of

thought as they progress through a glorious teleological
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view of history, genealogy's task reveals a messy,
fragmented view as it aims to identify,
the accidents, the minute deviations--or

conversely the complete reversals--the errors,

the false appraisals, and the faulty calculations
that gave birth to all those things that continue

to exist and have value for us; it is to discover
that truth and being does not lie at the root of

what we know and what we are, but the exteriority
of accidents.

(81)

In short, systems of thought are often contingent upon
and/or are a result of historical mishaps and sites of

conflict.
To recognize the contingency of systems of thought in

history, Foucault suggests a re-realization of history by

way of, what Nietzsche terms, Effective History. Effective
History is a historical standpoint which rejects "the dull

constancy of instinctual life" (Foucault 86)—instinctual

in the sense that we have learned habits, values, and

ideals rather than received them from some metaphysical
source. Effective history should impose its genealogical
gaze upon what Foucault terms, "the universe of rules" and

record "the history of morals, ideals, and metaphysical
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concepts, the history of the concept of liberty or the

ascetic life" (Foucault 86). A historical sense which
overthrows the universe of rules put in place by the

millennial play of systems of domination can evade the
metaphysical heights humankind habitually strives for and
refuse what Foucault deems "the certainty of absolutes"

(87). Consequently, an "effective" historical sense might
reveal discourses that might have otherwise remained mute.
Foucault and Reason
Bearing in mind Foucault's reluctance to idealize the

origins of systems of thought, we can now explore his
scrutiny of reason. Firstly, we should recall Habermas's
point of view that reason, or "what is rational," has

particular characteristics; for instance, an assertion must
adhere to "established norms" and when criticized, point to
"appropriate evidence ... in the light of legitimate
expectations" (qtd. in Ashenden and Owen 4). I will compare

this view—which has its "roots" in the Enlightenment's

version of Reason—with that of Foucault's. Taking into

consideration that Habermasian attempts to rescue modernity

stem from a re-articulation of the Enlightenment, Foucault
reminds us in "What'is Enlightenment" that the
Enlightenment should be scrutinized as an historical event
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rather than a formula for how society "should" think. He
reminds us that the Enlightenment emerged from a "complex
historical process that is located at a certain point in

the development of European societies" (43). Therefore,
even Enlightenment Reason should not escape genealogy's

scrutiny which, according to Foucault in "Nietzsche,
Genealogy, History," unsurprisingly unearths its messy

beginnings:
Examining the history of reason,

[the

genealogist] learns that it was born in an

altogether "reasonable" fashion—from chance;

devotion to truth and the precision of scientific
methods arose from the passion of scholars, their

reciprocal hatred, their fanatical and unending
discussions, and their spirit of competition—the
personal conflicts that slowly forged the weapons
of reason.

(78)

If, therefore, Foucault's notion that Enlightenment reason
emerges from passions, conflict, and competition,
Habermas's attempts to hypothesize established norms

(loosely based on a version of Enlightenment Reason), which
themselves seem to suggest that they are beyond human

"passions," and which ultimately seek to free societies
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from coercion, might arouse Foucauldian suspicion. This is

not to say Foucault rejects reason; according to Flyvbjerg,
Foucault agrees that in politics one must "side with
reason" ("Ideal Theory" 8). However, Flyvbjerg reiterates

Foucault words of caution in L' impossible Prison "that to
respect rationalism as an ideal should never constitute a
blackmail to prevent an analysis of the rationalities

really at work" (8). Foucault might, therefore, suggest
Habermas's "reasonable" norms are products of a contingent

notion of "truth" put in place by those in power.
Consequently, in contrast to Habermas's approach, genealogy

cannot authenticate these norms into absolutes--that is,
constitutional standards that anticipate and dictate human

behaviour—but instead, as Foucault tells us in "Nietzsche,
Genealogy, and History," it "seeks to reestablish the

various systems of subjection" (83). That is, genealogy
seeks to uncover what is left out while societal norms are

constructed.
Yet, as David Couzens Hoy articulates in Critical

Theory, genealogy does not look for any definitive
definitions about what is rational and what is not. Hoy

highlights Foucault's reluctance to be "for" or "against" a
traditional conception of reason citing Foucault's
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accusation that this point of view is "blackmail because it
seems to a make a 'rational critique of rationality'

impossible" (146). He states:
In contrast to Habermas, Foucault does not think
that to undertake a rational critique of

rationality one must construct a theory of what
rationality really is as the counterpoint to the

conception that took itself as rational but that
it is shown by critical investigation to be

veiling deep irrationality.

For Foucault, Reason

is "self creating." (146)

Hoy points out that the bottom line is not to argue about
what or what is not rational; instead, a genealogy attempts

to show that "because forms of rationality have been made,
they can be unmade .

.

. rationality is not an abstract

theory but enmeshed in the background web of concrete

practices" (148).

In short, rationality is a human

practice which is subject to the same errors, emotions,

conflicts, and accidents that face all humans during their

moment of historical difference.
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Foucault and Contemporary Society
Ashenden1 and Owen highlight two problematics which
articulate Foucault's critical approach, both

archeologically and genealogically:
1. How do human beings govern themselves and

others by the production of truth?
2. How can the growth of capabilities [in modern

society] be disconnected from the
intensification of power relations? (9)

Once again, Foucault does not aim to discover a unifying
and universal theory of truth which might be applied to a

politicized speech situation; instead, he wants to uncover

the politics underlying what is "True" or what, as he
states in "Truth and Power," "induces regular effects of
power" (73). He continues:
Each society has its regime of truth, its general

politics of truth: that is the types of

discourses which it accepts and makes function as
true; the mechanisms and instances which enable
one to distinguish true and false statements, the

means by which each is sanctioned; the techniques
and procedures accorded value in the acquisition
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of truth; the status of those who are charged
with saying what counts as true.

(73)

In a sense Foucault does recognize societal norms as

legitimate but their authority is contingent on a
particular society's recognition of truth. Thus, in

addressing the first problematic, we might hazard a guess

that societies govern themselves based on the contingent

notion of what is valid and accepted within the political
framework of that particular society.

To attend to the second problematic, Flyvbjerg ("Ideal

Theory, Real Rationality: Habermas versus Foucault and
Nietzsche") proposes that Foucault's critique suggests its

own normative standards; however, his standards don't

impose meaning on societies, rather, Foucauldian "norms"
challenge "every abuse of power whoever the author, whoever

the victims" (Flyvbjerg 9). Thus, a genealogical critique
might facilitate the disconnection between growth of

capabilities in modern society and the intensification of

power relations. Consequently, any form of government, be
it totalitarian or pluralistic, should be subject to
"analysis and critique based on [its citizens] will not to

be dominated [and] the ability to voice concerns in public"

(9). However, according to Flyvbjerg, Foucauldian norms
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cannot be given universal grounding because "they are based

on a personal and historical context" (9). Such a grounding

would be objectionable since it would give rise to
"utopian/totalitarian implications that Foucault would warn
against in any context, be it that of Marx, Rousseau or

Habermas" (9). For Foucault, at no other time in history
has more suffering been produced than by societies who
propound "strong commitments to implementing utopian

visions of the good" (9).

Conclusion
While the Habermas/Foucault debate on the
characteristics and possibilities of discourse in civil

society extends far beyond my discussion here, I hope I
have forwarded an introductory overview which will offer a

framework through which I can revisit composition's use of
Habermas. To summarize this overview therefore, I turn to
Bernd Stahl who states:

Briefly, Foucault stands for the investigation of

power ... on historical discourses whereas

Habermas stands for a normative explication of
the validity and acceptability of discourses.

Foucault can be read as an attack on the
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universalistic idea of rationality whereas

Habermas tries to uphold the power of reason and
the validity of norms despite the end of grand

narratives.

(4331)

As for Habermas's criticism of Foucault, Flyvbjerg
clarifies that it rests on his complaint that Foucault

cannot give "an account of the normative foundations for
his thinking" (220) . Furthermore, Habermas accuses Foucault

of being relativistic and crypto-normative (220). As for
Habermas, "he has not, so far, been able to demonstrate

that rational and universal grounding of his discourse

ethics is possible, he has only postulated such grounding"
(220). In short, Habermas hypothesizes rules which ensure

equal participation in democracy, but have yet to be
demonstrated; whereas Foucault, "shows restraint in matters

of commitments to ideas and systems of thought about what

is good for man" (222) based on his insistence that power
struggles dominate human history rather than the adherence

to abstract ideals.

So, what can the Habermas/Foucault debate offer
composition studies? It is my contention that it can inform

students in■a politicized classroom about the limits of

universal theories of "reasonable" discourse and the power
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dynamics inherent in those discourses; in view of this, I

address this assertion in more detail in Chapter Three.

Firstly, however, and bearing in mind the postmodern and

politicized landscape within which composition is often
situated, my next chapter will locate Habermasian theory in

articles by Patricia Roberts, John Trimbur, and Irene Ward.

In doing so, I will show how these compositionists, perhaps
unconsciously due to the influence of postmodernism on
composition studies, seem to amend Habermas's work by

turning to a Foucauldian method of critique. For my

purposes, scrutinizing these amendments serves to highlight

the dissimilarities between Habermasian and Foucauldian

theories of discourse which will, in turn, explicitly
inform a politicized classroom that concerns itself with
public writing.
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CHAPTER TWO
HABERMASIAN APPROACHES IN

COMPOSITION STUDIES

According to Jacqueline Rhodes, Habermas's very

"modern" attempt to continue the Enlightenment project,

with his focus on Universal Pragmatics, "does not fit
neatly into the landscape of postmodern composition

studies" (5). Consequently, the compositionists who look to

Habermas to inform their theories of writing try to make
him "fit" into their work by weaving in postmodern and, as
I will suggest, Foucauldian perspectives. The purpose of

this chapter, therefore, is twofold: firstly, I will
discuss the commanding influence of postmodernism in

composition and identify postmodern (and Foucauldian)

tendencies in the field by way of Dragon Milovanovic's
investigation, "Dueling Paradigms: Modernist v.
Postmodernist Thought." Secondly, I will discuss the work

of three compositionists, Patricia Roberts, John Trimbur,
and Irene Ward, each of whom use Habermasian theory to

enrich their discussions of writing in the collaborative
classroom, and, in Ward's case, to study the implications

of envisioning the Internet as a democratic public sphere.
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I will show that, in all three cases, these writers reveal

their postmodern leanings when they amend their use of

Habermas with Foucauldian perspectives. These perspectives
emerge in compositionists' discussions of difference,
dissensus, and the power relations inherent in discourses.

This indicates composition's endeavor to ground itself in

postmodern thought; hence, Habermas's modern leanings—
which come across in his adherence to an ideal speech

situation—seem somewhat contradictory in the light of
composition's postmodern tendencies.

Postmodernism

Foucault and Postmodernism

In The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity: Twelve
Lectures, Habermas dedicates two chapters to a critique of
Foucault who, according to James Schmidt, "[has] followed
Nietzsche in regarding Modernity as utterly beyond

redemption" (315). While Foucault has rejected affiliation
with "movements," he is, more often than not, labeled a

postmodernist. For instance, in "Dueling Paradigms:
Modernity v. Post Modernist Thought," Milovanovic claims:

Post modernist analysis had its roots in French
thought, particularly during the late 1960s and
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early 1970s.

Here, with the continued

disillusionment with conventional critical

thought, a transition from Hegelian to
Nietzschean thought took place.

Deleuze,

Guttari, Derrida, Lyotard, Baudrillard, and

Foucault .

.

. were to emerge bearing the banner

of postmodern thinking (par. 4).
Like Milovanovic, Gary Aylesworth also attests to
Foucault's postmodern leanings, claiming that his

"application of genealogy to formative moments in
modernity's history" places him firmly "within the scope of

postmodern discourse" (par. 24).
Firstly then, before I address Roberts, Trimbur, and
Ward, I'd like to discuss the effects of postmodernism on

composition and how we can locate Foucauldian principles

within postmodern composition studies.

Postmodernism and the Writer

Composition has clearly assumed a postmodern
perspective in the last two decades.

In The Bedford

Bibliography: History of Rhetoric and Composition, Nedra
Reynolds, Bruce Herzberg, and Patricia Bizzell state that
the,
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powerful themes (in comp studies) of the 1980's

[were] social construction, politics, literacy,
and gender issues . .

.

[which] extended into the

nineties to work that related composition to
postmodern and cultural studies.

(9)

Many books and articles have focused on postmodern trends
which are intricately connected with social constructivist

theories. For instance, in "Porno Blues: Stories from First

Year Composition," Lee Ann Carroll cites postmodernity's

influence on such composition giants as Lester Faigley
(Fragments of Rationality: Post Modernity and the Subject
of Composition), Patricia Harkin and John Schilb
(Contending with Words: Composition in the Postmodern Age),

and Susan Miller (Textual Carnivals)

(916).

Faigley,

according to Carroll, claims that composition has "come to

accept a postmodern view of knowledge and discourse of all

kinds as socially and politically constructed" (917).
Accordingly, Carroll emphasizes Faigley's point of view and

demonstrates the postmodern influence on writing studies in

five key areas. These "five key postmodernist ideas"--which
shape the production of writing--state:
(1)

"The stories we tell are the stories that are
culturally available to us" (920).
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(2)

"The conventions and details of many of the

stories we tell are in a sense, already written
and read by the culture" (922).

(3)

"The stories we can tell are constrained by the

context in which we tell them, with much left out
or suppressed" (923).

(4)

"Non-narrative forms are often closely related to
suppressed personal narratives" (927).

(5)

"All texts are interested—none are inherently
"Normal" or "Neutral" (928).

In citing these concepts, Carroll takes up the postmodern
point of view that dispenses with traditional and modernist

views of the lone writer. Furthermore, she indicates the
non-neutral characteristics of discourse.

To clarify the postmodern position, Milovanovic
explains that "modernist thought has privileged the idea of

the individual as a person who is assumed to be conscious,

whole, self-directing, reflective and unitary" (par. 24).
However, as Carroll's concepts indicate, the writer as a

self-constructing individual is no longer accepted by the
postmodern paradigm. Milovanovic elaborates that the
postmodern subject "is more determined than determining, is
less unified .

.

. caught within the constraints of
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competing discourses and their structuring properties"

(par. 25). By "structuring properties," Milovanovic refers

to the subject's socio-cultural experience. Thus, the
writer can only write what is experientially available
according to her/his socio-cultural history.
The most important aspect of Carroll's work, for my
discussion here, is that in the postmodern paradigm,
knowledge and discourse echo contingent and provisional

versions of truth which, as we might surmise from above,
are culturally bound. In short, cultural ideas are

conditional on (to use a Foucauldian expression) a specific
"discursive formation," that is, a system of thought. Thus,

when Carroll states that the stories written by her
students are already "culturally available to us," and

"written and read by the culture," she indicates that they
are informed by cultural practices that are, as Milovanovic
reinforces, anything but neutral. He states that for
postmodernists there are,

many discourses reflective of local sites of

production, each in turn, existing with a

,

potential for the embodiment of desire in

signifiers and for .the construction of realities,
(par. 34)
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This "desire" relates to whose "realities" are constructed

and maintained as the dominant norm.

From a postmodern

perspective, we can assume that these realities reflect
dominant and powerful discourses; consequently, a

postmodernist outlook indicates that we can expect, as
Carroll iterates, that "much is suppressed" during the
construction of these realities.

Thus, Carroll's fifth concept "all texts are
interested--none are inherently 'Normal.

. .'" indicates

the postmodern, and Foucauldian, outlook that knowledge and

power are inextricably interwoven.

Knowledge and ideology

are consequences of the dominant discourse which is,
generally, perceived as the most relevant, and since, as

Milovanovic states, "subjects must situate themselves in

it, they are subject to its interpellative effects" (par.
42). In short, no text is value-free. Every text reproduces

ideological "norms" in one way or another, and we can thus

assume, as Foucault shows us, that these norms reflect the
interests of those in power. In Carroll's case, this plays

out as her students write for-those-in-authority (with all

the power relations that implies); thus, students'
production is informed by the demands of the academy.
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Postmodernism and "Radical" Composition
James Berlin offers more examples of the substantial
effects of postmodernism on composition studies. In "Post

structuralism, Cultural Studies and the Composition

Classroom: Postmodern Theory in Practice," he maintains,
It is clear to me that rhetoric and composition

studies has arrived as a serious field of study
because it has taken into account the best that

has been thought about and said about its
concerns from the past and present, and I have
found that postmodern work in historical and

contemporary rhetorical theory has done much to
further this effort.

(16)

As far as, what Weisser terms, "radical" composition is

concerned, the importance of postmodernism lies in the fact
that it has informed "one of the most distinguishing
features of the radical compositionist' s approach [which
is] its emphasis on ideology" (Weisser 27).

Milovanovic tackles the issue of how ideology surfaces

in systems of thought in his discussions of "society and

social structure" (3). For modernists, the search for over

encompassing theories of society typifies modernist
thought—such as Habermas's theory of communicative action,
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which we might assume to be a foundational, or rather,
constitutional approach to societal theory. Contrarily, as

Milovanovic states, postmodernism dictates "that the search
for an overall, all-encompassing totalizing theory [of

society] is an illusory exercise" (par. 13). Milovanovic

further claims that for postmodernism, "no possibility
exists for precisely specifying initial conditions" of a

stable order in society (par. 13). That is, postmodernism
rejects foundationalist ideological principles. This view

corresponds with Foucault's assertion that there are no
"ideal" beginnings in societal structure, for, when

individuals or governments refer to ideal beginnings,
systems of thought dictate who speaks and what can or

cannot be said. Following this, we might assume that the
voices that are heard reflect dominant ideologies.

Postmodernism thus views the emergence of ideological
paradigms as the result of conflict rather than adherence

to ideals. As noted in Chapter One, this notion corresponds
to Foucauldian theory. To illustrate this concept of
ideology further, Weisser cites Berlin's discussion of

discourse and the ideological burdens it carries in

Rhetoric and Ideology; Weisser states,
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Radical compositionists see discourse as deeply

implicated with dominant ideology, and they see

ideology as transmitted through language

practices that are always at the center of
conflicts and contest.

(27)

In "Post structuralism ..." Berlin elaborates, stating
that the postmodern subject "is considered a construction

of varying signifying practices, the uses of language, of a
given historical moment" (18). These "signifying practices"

are discourses that identify us and tell us "how we should

behave in terms of such categories as gender, race, class,
ethnicity and the like" (18). To emphasize, Berlin cites

(among others) Foucault's "discursive formations." These
formations amount to, "elaborate systems of signifying

systems [which] form power/knowledge formations that govern
action during successive stages in history" (19).

We can

assume, therefore, that these power/knowledge formations
shape discourses which uphold the signifying practices of

dominant discourse.
From an idealist perspective, it would appear that
since the subjects within a discursive regime share the
recognition of "signifying practices," Berlin's ideas could

coincide with Habermas's insofar as participants in the
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"lifeworld" recognize established shared values and norms.
These shared practices could possibly further Habermasian

ideals of mutual understanding and co-operation within
societal structures. However, as Berlin reveals in

"Poststructuralism . .

."we are all composed of "various

competing discourses, conflicted and contradictory scripts,
that make our consciousness anything but unified, coherent

and autonomous" (18). Consequently, the competing

discourses that make up our shared "lifeworlds," possibly
share fewer values and norms than Habermas envisages, even

if equal participation in a discourse community is context

dependent; the writing classroom is one example. Thus,
overcoming the obstacles put in place by the power
relations inherent in competing discourses can obstruct

consensual procedures.

Indeed, as Rhodes points out, the nature of discourse
is variable. For instance, she furthers Grady and Well's
notion that discourse communities "each [have their] own

set of questions—of truth and value,

[and] of social roles

and sincerity" (5-6). Both Berlin and Rhodes, therefore,

appear to reiterate the postmodern point of view put
forward by Milovanovic in his discussion of "discourse"
which highlights the multiplicity of voices, "dialectics of
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struggle" and "languages of possibility" within a given

society. He claims that unlike modernism, postmodernism

does not assume a neutral discourse and the "signified is

multiaccentual, the site, of diverse struggles" (par. 34).
Consequently, postmodernists "identify the violence of

language," and "linguistic repression and alienation are
the results of historically situated hegemonic discourses"

(par. 35). It is thus that the variability of discourse and
the contradictory and conflicted subject pose challenges to
the attainment of Habermas's utopian, idealized, and
intersubjective speech situation as it attempts to address

social change. As Berlin states,
The signifying practices of different groups
. .

. compete in forwarding different agendas for

the ways people are to regard their historical
positions and their modes of responding to them
and these signifying practices are always a scene
of battle.

(22)

While Habermasian theory attempts to account for and

transcend these battles with a universalizing theory of
communication, I take up Rhodes's position that

postmodernist composition studies' attempt to "fully use
Habermas [while] at the same time ... we resist the
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impulse to universalize ourselves or our ways to knowledge"
(6) is problematic.

In "Ideological Critique in Rhetoric and
Composition," Gary Olson's point of view is similar to

Berlin's and thus demonstrates the effects of postmodernism
on composition pedagogy. He claims,
significantly, the kind of pedagogy that Berlin

and many of us envision is thoroughly rhetorical:
it is deeply concerned with context, audience,
and how signifying practices are employed to

further ideological interests.

(85)

(We might recall that Foucault labels this furthering of

ideological interests, "The Will to Truth"). It is also
important to note here that Olson confirms composition's

political involvement; indeed, themes of "ideology,"

"hegemony" and "power"—which are all implicated in
Foucault's work—dominate much of the language surrounding

current composition theory.
Meanwhile, one can locate the aforementioned terms—as
well as radical composition's preoccupation with ideology--

in the postmodern realm via Milovanovic's explication of
"Social Change." As far as the capacity for social change

is concerned in modernism, an alternative vision of the
54

social is usually tied to the initial logic of the major
premise of the status quo (par. 66). Thus, the
oppositionist campaigning for social change, often

"inadvertently recreates the dominant repressive order"
(par. 66).

On the other hand, postmodernist thought

pertaining to "social change," "focuses more on nonlinear
conceptions of historical change"; consequently, "much room
must be made for the contributions of contingency, irony,

the spontaneous, and the marginal" (par. 67). Thus, for
Milovanovic, key concepts for social change from a
postmodern stance include: premises of action based on

tolerability, multiplicities of resistance to power,
genealogy, dialectics of struggle, dialogism, affirmative

action, and language of possibility (par. 65).
After reviewing Milovanovic's postmodern
characteristics regarding social change, we can see how

radical composition's interests overlap with a postmodern
and Foucauldian sensibility; particularly, in how
postmodernism approaches issues of diversity, tolerance for

the incommensurable, antifoundationalism, and constitutive

theory (par. 8).

Furthermore, composition indicates its

alignment with postmodernism with its attention to
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multiplicities of resistance to power, and dialectics of
struggle (par. 65).

My intention in this discussion is to situate the

Habermas/Foucault debate within the boundaries of

contemporary composition studies which, in turn, largely
positions itself against a postmodern landscape.

In the

latter part of this chapter therefore, I visit the work of
Patricia Roberts, John Trimbur, and Irene Ward to see (a)

how they have made use of Habermasian theories of
communicative action in the Public Sphere and that (b),
when elucidating these theories, they unconsciously fall

back on Foucauldian principles which address postmodern
perspectives of problems of ideology, conflict,

variability, and most importantly, the power relations
inherent in discourse.

Habermasian Theory in Composition Studies

Before exploring composition's use of Habermas, I
should briefly recap the "debate."

As Samantha Ashenden

and David Owen posit,

Habermas' objection to Foucault's account [of
rational critique] is that it identifies being

context dependent with being context bound,
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whereas he sees his own activity as deploying
criteria of rationality which are context

transcending.

(13)

Challenging Habermas, Foucault's critique exhibits

skepticism toward Habermas's critical reflection with its
claims to transcendence and universal principles (13).

This skepticism rests on Foucault's concern that Habermas's

modernist insistence on proposing "the form of critical
reflection," as opposed to "elaborating a form of critical

reflection" (1), "tends to freeze certain juridical ways of

thought and action"(13-14). In short, by positing his rules
for the ideal speech situation, Habermas imposes standards

on democratic consensus which, for Foucault, must be

subjected to genealogical scrutiny. We must not forget that
both Habermas and Foucault are interested in inclusionary

emancipatory processes, but as Flyvebjerg suggests,
We [might] ask whether such empowerment is best

understood and acted, in terms of [modernist]
consensus or whether [a postmodern examination

of] conflict is a more suitable frame of
reference.

("Habermas and Foucault: Thinkers for

Civil Society" 211)

57

Bearing this question in mind, we can now look to how
composition has made use of Habermasian theory.
Patricia Roberts

As discussed before, Rhodes critiques composition's

recent use of Habermasian theory, noting the difficulty
compositionists have encountered with Habermas's writing
style, translation, and most importantly, with his

articulation of ideology (2). These ideological

difficulties have earned him criticism, besides Foucault's,

as Foss, Foss, and Trapp note:
Many critics fault Habermas's tendency toward
utopianism, which down plays the particulars of

political life in favor of abstract and
generalized notions of rationality and

emancipation.

For example, they criticize

Habermas for his notion of the ideal speech
situation—the foundation of his notion of

rationality.

The very idea of the ideal is

problematic for many scholars because it suggests

a perfection not possible in language.

(252)

I propose this idea of perfection based on abstract notions

of Enlightenment-wrought rationality has proved problematic
for compositionists. For example, in her 1991 "Habermas's
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Varieties of Communicative Actions: Controversy without

Combat," Patricia Roberts discusses Habermas's notion of
intersubjective agreement; which (as discussed in the last

chapter) is the sort of interaction aimed at reaching

"intersubjective mutuality of reciprocal understanding,
shared knowledge, mutual trust, and accord with one
another'" (Habermas qtd. in Roberts, par. 20). Placing her
student writers in this intersubjective realm, Roberts
imagines a version of the ideal speech situation in order

to (a) address issues surrounding persuasive writing,

(b)

"orient classes heavily towards class discussion" in order
1
to establish audience (par. 35), and (c) determine
productive ways of collaboration (par. 39).

However, after drawing from Habermasian theory to

envision a communicatively competent classroom aimed at
consensus, Roberts notes abruptly that "there are problems

with Habermas" (par. 41). She writes "The argument is that

trying to orient students towards consensus will orient
them towards compromise" (par. 41). Using the example of a

female student in a class full of male students, Roberts
highlights the difficulty the female student has in
convincing male students that "certain apparently harmless
practices (such as whistling on the street) are actually
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I

destructive" (par. 42).

Roberts concludes that the female

student is likely to encounter problems reaching her
.

I

audience through rational argument because these
destructive language practices are so embedded in their
I

culture.

In this scenario, it appears Roberts anticipates the
i

postmodern position which "identifies the violence of
language" and "[the] linguistic repression and alienation
I

[which] are the results of historically situated hegemonic

discourses" (Milovanovic, pari 35). Consequently, Roberts's

student might abandon her argument, that is, her
I

justification for alienation in a mostly male environment.

However, Roberts asserts that this version of the outcome
of this scenario rests on a misunderstanding of Habermasian
I

consensus, for the goal of her class is to "identify

difference" within the Habermdsian arena of "reciprocal
!

understanding, shared knowledge and mutual trust"

(Habermas, qtd. in Roberts, par 43).
Yet, by applying Habermasian theory to a gender issue,

Roberts unconsciously stumbles upon what Flyvbjerg deems a
i

considerable gap in Habermas's work. He maintains that
I

gender politics are possibly1better addressed via

Foucauldian analysis than Habermasian discourse ethics
60

I

(225) because "the very idea .of the ideal [that Habermasian
discourse ethics imply]

. because it

suggests a perfection not possible in language" (Foss,
Foss, and Trapp 252). The imperfections of language, I
!
i

suggest, are especially apparent in gender issues. To

illustrate Flyvbjerg asserts

"historically, the very idea

of civil society contains a gender bias and this bias must

be rooted out" (225). He continues, "Progress has been slow
I
I

in developing the theory of communicative rationality in
ways that would be sensitive to gender and race" (225).
i
Meanwhile, "Habermas has I acknowledged that his

i
analysis does not include gender, ethnicity, class, popular
i
culture" (Flyvbjerg 225) because these differences, within
i
the public sphere--or for our [purposes, the writing

classroom—can be overcome by'-rational debate (226). That

is, Habermas believes if we can communicate competently by
way of rational discourse, we Jean overcome problems of

difference in areas such as gender and ethnicity. For many

feminists, however, Habermas's approach is ineffective in
I

combating problems associated;with gender because of the
deeply rooted nature of gender inequality in civil society.
i

Indeed, Keane tells us that domination and inequality are
I

deeply rooted in the concept of civil society, pointing out
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that our notion of what civil society is rests on the idea

of the white "civilized European male" (qtd. in Flyvbjerg
211). Following this, Keane demonstrates that,

historically, women have been deemed subordinate. Civil

society has also transferred its methods of subjugation to
other groups such as those of' differing ethnicity or sexual

orientation (211).

In contrast to Habermas's approach, Flyvbjerg

elaborates that, via genealogical analysis, Foucault
attends to the postmodern issue of identity politics

(including gender issues) and, its connections to diversity
and difference which "is crucial for understanding civil

society and for acting in it"' (225). As a result, feminists
have found Foucauldian theory more sympathetic to their

cause and "have been skeptical about Habermas's confidence
in abstract rationality" (2250• As we can see, then, in her
discussion of this particular1 gender issue, Roberts

highlights postmodern concerns with marginality and lack of

access rather than modernist ideas that focus on the
"search for over encompassing1 theories of society and
social development" (Milovanovic, par. 10) such as

Habermas's ideal speech situation.

62

Even if they have been made aware of Habermasian

conditions for the ideal speech situation, one wonders how
far an instructor might get in attempting to persuade a

room full of socially conditioned men to rethink their
position on, what Roberts calls, the "inner reality" of
women (par. 43). Can Habermas's conditions for consensus be
amended by developing Foucauldian strategies? Flyvbjerg

suggests "Elaborating genealogies, for instance, of gender
and race leads to an understanding of how relations of
domination between men and women, and between different
people, can be changed" (225). Furthermore, in actuality,

non-discursive means to promote change have historically
been more effective: "Feminists . .

. get their issues on

the public agenda not primarily by rational consensus but
through the power struggles and conflicts characteristic of

activism and social change" (226). Consequently, from my
perspective, by urging her students "to identify
differences," on feminist issues, Roberts actually sets the

stage more appropriately for a Foucauldian approach to this
subject via a study of conflict and realpolitik, rather

than for a Habermasian attempt at rational argument.
However, as I will discuss in Chapter Three, both
Habermas's and Foucault's approach might be utilized in the
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politicized classroom in order to compare how their methods
of critique set the stage for debate in the socio-political
realm. In the meantime, I turn to John Trimbur's "Consensus

and Difference in Collaborative Learning" in order to
explore his use of Habermasian theory and his subsequent

(yet unvoiced) reliance on Foucault.
John Trimbur

In his 2005, The Function of Theory in Composition
Studies, Raul Sanchez, following Victor Vitanza, expresses

concern about compositionists who, through their theories
of "hope," are attempting to follow Habermas's formula for
critical rationalism and provide a concept of universal and

legitimate knowledge based on Habermasian procedures for
ideal consensus (23). Sanchez accuses these compositionists

of partaking in a foundationalist "game of knowledge" which

is projected through a "nostalgia for universals and a
belief in ideal speech acts" (23). Sanchez's point of view

is worth mentioning because his stance confronts the antiFoucauldian belief in ideals and is perhaps more
sympathetic to composition's postmodern position than that

of the compositionists he accuses. The "belief in ideals"
that Sanchez is wary of, however, comes across somewhat in
John Trimbur's "Consensus and Difference in Collaborative
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Learning;" indeed, Trimbur makes much use of Habermasian
theory. However, even though Trimbur's article ultimately
points out his, seemingly postmodern, concern that

collaborative learning and consensus might squash

traditionally muted voices while participants in a speech
situation remain loyal to social and hierarchical

standards, his use of Habermasian idealism seems at odds
with his purpose in the essay.

Trimbur makes much of Habermas's position that
participants in a conversation are not so much motivated by
rational consensus but by what Habermas terms "success

orientation" (610). He talks at length about uneven power
structures in conversation and appeals to compositionists

to "look at collaborative learning not merely as a process
of consensus making but, more importantly, as a process of
I

identifying differences and locating these differences in

relation to each other" (610). Indeed, he demands that as

we attempt to reach consensus, we should take into account

a rhetoric of dissensus; that is, the "network of competing
and contradictory interests" that "pervade writing
situations" (610). As an example of how students might
undertake such an endeavor, Trimbur questions literary

evaluations of what constitutes "good" literature and the
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criteria which dictates that some texts are "excluded and
devalued" (613). He asks why some texts such as Shakespeare
and Hemingway qualify as literary, while others—Stephen
King, for example—do not (613). In posing these questions

to his students, Trimbur requests that they "investigate
collectively these implicit hierarchies in terms of the

relations of power that organize them" (613).

In examining these literary hierarchies of power,

Trimbur asks his student to engage in what Milovanovic
might deem a postmodern exercise. Specifically, I posit
that by suggesting his students "begin to critically
examine the prevailing representation of literature and the

institutional base on which it rests" (613), Trimbur seems

to imply that his students paddle about in the postmodern
point of view that (once again) "linguistic repression and

alienation are the results of historically situated
hegemonic discourses" (Milovanovic, par. 35). In doing so,

Trimbur displays an unconscious reliance on Foucauldian

thought by asking his students to unearth the differences
that cause the segregation and resulting canonical
hierarchies of certain types of reading. In short (and at
the risk of sounding repetitive), Trimbur requests that his

students engage in genealogical activity. Certainly, via
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his use of "dissensus," he seems to advocate the
Foucauldian approach which attempts to search out the
unfortunate victims of discursive power struggles or rather

"[how it happens that] at a given period something could be
said and something else has never been said" (Foss, Foss,

and Trapp 347).

Following Flyvbjerg, we might indeed recall that one

of the fundamental differences between Habermasian and
Foucauldian thought lies in how they attend to the problem

of power.

As mentioned in my first chapter, Flyvbjerg says

that in view of the regulations of dominance, Habermas

approaches the issue of dominance "from a universalistic
theory of discourse,

[while] Foucault seeks out a

genealogical understanding of power relations in specific

contexts" (223). In short, Flyvbjerg accuses Habermas of
not paying enough attention to power relationships in
discourse. Consequently, Trimbur seems to be echoing

Foucault when, later in his article, he states:
Unlike Habermas ... I do not believe removing
relations of domination and systematic

distortion, whether ideological or neurotic, from
the conversation is likely to establish the
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conditions in which consensus will express a

rational will and permit what all can want.

(615)

Once again, Habermas does not attend to the problem of
power because he believes rational discourse can overcome
relations of dominance. Foucault, on the other hand, "sees

the examination of resistance and struggle [as] the most
solid basis for the practice of freedom" (Flyvbjerg 223).

As we might assume from the excerpt above, Trimbur appears
to be endorsing Foucault, thus confirming his position in
the postmodern realm. The postmodern view, however, is

ultimately at odds with the Habermasian approach he
employs.
As I stated earlier, Trimbur makes use of Habermas's
position that rational consensus is hindered by

participants' orientation towards success within a speech

situation. Simply put, this.means that rational discussion
takes a back seat to those who insist on proving a point of

view. To reduce success orientation in consensual debate—
while proposing that his students study the power relations
embedded in literary discourses—Trimbur suggests that

Habermas's ideal speech situation be posed as a "deferred

and utopian" (614) idea of consensus. More specifically, it

should be used as a critical measure from which students
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can imagine consensus—and thus be relieved of the pressure
to attain it--as "a necessary fiction of reciprocity and
mutual recognition, the dream of conversation as perfect

dialogue" (612). Simply put, Trimbur states that the ideal
speech situation can never be achieved. Rather like Plato's

place of ideal forms, Habermasian consensus (symmetrical,

non-coercive rationality) for Trimbur, is never attainable
but always something to strive for.

From a postmodern perspective, Trimbur's displaced

view of consensus as an unreachable ideal seems somewhat
problematic. For it echoes the foundationalism Sanchez

speaks of at the beginning of this section, with its

nostalgia for ideals. On the one hand, Trimbur calls for a

postmodern examination of the rhetoric of dissensus which

essentially asks students to dissect knowledge production.
Yet, on the other, he asks his students to imagine a

"utopian representation of consensus [which] offers
students a powerful critical instrument to interrogate the
conversation" (612); this imagined utopia implies the

"real" possibility of an "ideal" knowledge, however
unreachable. Thus, Trimbur sends a mixed message for he

appears caught between two paradigms. His latter request
seems to advance the modernist stance that it is possible
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to imagine an over-arching theory of discourse/knowledge;
in this case, the ideal speech situation. Yet, as we might

again recall from Milovanovic, a postmodernist point of
view assumes "that the search for an overall, all-

encompassing totalizing theory is an illusory exercise"
(par. 13). This corresponds with the Foucauldian point of
view that the quest for ideals is potentially dangerous.

For, recalling Flyvbjerg's comments from Chapter One, we

should be wary of ideals "given the historical experience
that few things have produced more suffering among humans

than strong commitments to implementing utopian visions of

good" (222).
The contradiction in Trimbur's article, it seems,
places us firmly within the territory of the

Habermas/Foucault "debate." On the one hand, Trimbur's
suggestion that.students imagine a transcendent version of

the ideal speech situation offers them a critical measure

from which they can examine the possibility of dominance in
the process of consensus. Yet, from a Foucauldian point of

view, Trimbur has resorted to imagining the unimaginable.

For, as he hovers above abstract ground positing fictive
ideals, he implies there is a definitive approach to
critical reflection. For Foucault, posing fictive ideals is
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a dangerous practice, and he might ask Trimbur what
constitutes the perfect and ideal speech situation; that

is, how might it manifest itself (even if it is
unattainable) according to what discursive formation?
Consequently, Trimbur's contradiction—in his utopian

driven, yet, postmodern writing classroom—seems to bring

us back to Flyvbjerg's question concerning civil democracy,
which we can thus extend to a politicized writing
classroom; that is, should we analyze ideological dominance
and hegemonic practices via practical examinations of
conflict in historical contexts (or what Trimbur terms

"dissensus"), or, should we address societal/political
change by recommending Habermasian criteria that

establishes standards (however utopian) for democratic
debate? I will explore this question in depth in Chapter
Three by focusing on the usefulness of a comparative
analysis of the Habermas/Foucault debate in the politicized
classroom; in particular, I find, in order to locate a
point of complementarity between the two philosophers, the

idea of Habermas's ideal speech situation should, perhaps,

be dropped.

For now, however, I turn to my third

compositionist, Irene Ward, who also makes use of

Habermasian theories of participation in the public sphere.
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Irene Ward

In "How Democratic can we Get: The Internet, the
Public Sphere, and Public Discourse," Ward looks to how

Habermas's theory of the public sphere can be used "as a
lens through which to query the claims that the Internet

and its discursive practices will serve as a transformative

tool that will benefit democratic politics" (366).

Democratic debate in the Internet version of Habermas's
public sphere would, of course, follow his guidelines for
rational democratic practice:

It would have to offer a public space or arena
for people to debate issues in order to influence
civil society and the state: moreover, the public

discourse formed in response to such debate will
have been "legitimized" by the scrutiny and

challenge of other citizens and stakeholders in
the debate.

(367)

If we recall from my first chapter, debate in the public

sphere guarantees "every citizen the right of access to
discussion 'in the public sphere by virtue of the abstract

right of humanness" (Foss, Foss, and Trapp 239). Thus,
"legitimized" public discourse ensures that no one is
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excluded, and rational debate, which strives for
communicative competence, is the medium for conversation.

However, within the first few paragraphs of her

discussion, Ward succumbs to the Foucauldian problem of
historical difference. She writes,

Although the internet and the bourgeois public

sphere do seem similar in many ways and seem to
point to the Internet's potential to function as

a form of public sphere, other factors such as
. .

. differing historical circumstances also

seem to undercut that potential.

(366)

As far as our current "historical" position is concerned,

circumstances look initially promising in terms of access
to the cyber sphere. For, the Internet offers anonymity to
all that want to publish on it (369). For example, Ward

points out that the identity of writers on the net is
"obscured and often hidden" (369) as they hide behind'
pseudonyms and/or establish "false markers of age, gender,
ethnicity, and so on" (369). However, while this serves to
level the playing field on the net as far as social

hierarchies are concerned, it does little to relieve the

social/ethnic/gender-related tensions that occur in face to
face situations. Furthermore, as Ward points out, this
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anonymity "can also lead to a great deal of mistrust

online" (370).
Like Roberts and Trimbur before her, Ward focuses on

problems of "difference" in her discussion of communication

in the public sphere. As I have established previously,
these differences, which are recognized as set against a
particular historical landscape and dictated by those in

power, look suspiciously like Foucauldian concerns. As
Ward's article indicates, while Habermas sets the stage for

public debate, he glosses over "difference" by asserting

that that the "proper" use of rationality can be used to

overcome systems of domination. Yet, in his discussion of
Ward's use of Habermas, Christian Weisser points out that

"Habermas fails to acknowledge that . .

. equality [in the

public sphere] has historically been limited to white,
male, propertied, citizens" (50). It is quite possible to

conclude, therefore,' that for Habermas, the "proper use of
rationality" is made manifest according to the standards of
this group.

What, we should ask, constitutes "equality" for a
particular group of people in any given circumstance? As
far as the Internet is concerned, for Ward, if and when the

Internet becomes commodified, democratic practice within it
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might be limited only to those who can afford the

technology. She states:
Needless to say, the same social and economic
forces and institutions--race, class, and gender

—that allow for unequal access to education in

this country will operate to make the issue of

access a severe limitation to the ultimate
democratic potential of the internet.

(375)

Unfortunately, the fate of inclusion within this particular

public sphere lies in participants' attempts to "desist

from strategic action" (Flyvbjerg 213). Yet historically,

as Ward indicates, the drive for economic success tends to

encourage strategic action within the public sphere.

Conclusion

In each of my responses to composition's use of

Habermas, I am drawn back to Flyvbjerg's questions
regarding the Habermas/Foucault debate and its implications

for ideological and emancipatory change in civil society.
That is, do we face head on the problems of exclusion,

difference, diversity and the politics of identity? (211).
Or, do we look to ethical consensus to set universal
standards for emancipatory behaviour? So far, it seems
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composition's point of view addresses the former as it

tries to amend Habermasian theories with those of Foucault.
However, composition's use of Habermas and its subsequent,
yet unvoiced, reliance on Foucault brings me to the
conclusion that, following Flyvbjerg, a comparison of "the

discourse ethics of Habermas with the power analytics and
ethics of Foucault" (210) would provide a useful framework
from which to understand and bring about social change.

Indeed, a fully articulated look at the debate--that is, a

comparison of the two methods of critique--might inform the

politicized writing class about how "truth" is determined,

and how reason is awarded "reasonable" status.
Following this, Chapter Three will see what use

composition might make of the Habermas/Foucault debate
within politicized writing studies. In addition, it will

explore the possibility of reconciliation between the two
philosophers which might offer us new ways to imagine our

classrooms as "public spheres." Finally, I will look to

Peter Rule's explanation of "dialogic space" in the South
African "Tuition Project" and to Patricia Bizzell's
discussion of rational debate in medieval Spain to gain a

sense of how the Habermas/Foucault debate offers us a
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framework from which we can identify "rationalities" at

work within particular historical circumstances.
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CHAPTER THREE

THE HABERMAS/FOUCAULT DEBATE IN
THE WRITING CLASSROOM

In this chapter, I will discuss further the term
"radical composition" and what it entails in the current
composition climate. Taken together, the Habermasian and

Foucauldian theories I discuss offer radical composition
valuable insights into methods of critique based on Bernd

Stahl's assumption that "both aim to be critical in order

to improve human circumstances" (4434). Considering radical
composition's preoccupation with the ideologies embedded in
discourses, and public writing's desire to initiate social

change in some form or another, the Habermas/Foucault
debate might subsequently inform a politicized classroom.

That is, an articulation of the debate can provide a
specific theoretical background from which to examine

public writing while presenting to students the views that
characterize modern (and Habermasian) thought, as well as

those that constitute postmodern (and Foucauldian) thought.
Following this, an elucidation of the debate offers
students the critical stimulus to examine social issues

without subjecting them to an instructor's political
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stance; indeed, overtly politicizing the classroom has been

a controversial issue in recent composition history.
Consequently, students in a politicized writing space,
informed by the Habermas/Foucault debate, might make up

their own minds on social issues.

In order to demonstrate how the Habermas/Foucault
debate might inform students' critical inquiry into the

historical, cultural, and political influences on

discourses, I will turn to Peter Rule's explanation of the
"Tuition Project" in South Africa. A close look at this
project reveals how "the playing field" for rational debate
and learning is fraught with ideological struggle.

Ideological struggle and its influence on rationality are
also revealed in Patricia Bizzell's examination of the 1263
disputation at Barcelona in medieval Spain.

Although this

particular debate occurred centuries ago, Bizzell's
assessment offers us a Foucauldian-like cautionary tale as

to the nature of rationality in specific historical

contexts.
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The Habermas/Foucault Debate
in Radical Composition
Set within the postmodern paradigm, radical

composition concerns itself with ways in which language
perpetuates dominant ideology-as we have seen from the

compositionists under discussion. In Moving beyond Academic

Discourses .

.

. Weisser claims that "radical theories in

composition studies .

.

. have recently begun to conceive

of the public sphere as ... a useful metaphor for how we

might envision writing classrooms" (xiii). Thus, with its
interest in’ how ideology is perpetuated, radical

composition emphasizes that students recognize "that public

discourse is not merely the 'clear' articulation of facts"
(Weisser 113). Instead, it asks students to "be much more
critical in their interpretation of public discourse"

(Weisser 113). Accordingly, the writing-classroom-as-

public-sphere can encourage "student writing to have real
political and social ramifications" (57).

Weisser specifies how Habermas's theory of the public

sphere, with its focus on emancipatory discourses in the
form of the ideal speech situation, has sparked interest in

the field of radical composition. Yet, as Weisser, Roberts
et al, and numerous other critics have stated, Habermas's
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theories are problematic.

Interestingly,

(as I have

shown), the problems compositionists foresee in Habermas's

work are indeed those that Foucault addresses in the

debate: Habermas's approaches to "difference", power, and
ideology. As Weisser states,
Two,) "Habermas . .

(and as I explored in Chapter

. fails to fully recognize the degree

to which ideology shapes public discourse, and [his]
investigations are less thorough as a result" (96). As
Habermasian discourse theory fails to account fully for the

problems of power and ideology in the public sphere,
Foucault's power analytics can be viewed as a logical

amendment to the gaps postmodern compositionists stumble

upon in Habermasian scholarship. A Foucauldian scrutiny of
ideology might thus enhance Habermasian approaches to
discourse in the public sphere considering "ideology is one
of the most central aspects of current composition theory"
(Weisser 96).

The Problem of Politics in the Classroom
Introducing the Habermas/Foucault debate into a

politicized writing classroom might overcome some of the
controversy surrounding radical composition. Despite

Weisser's enthusiastic endorsement of radical composition,
the idea of the writing classroom as a politicized public
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space has been a subject for debate for a number of years;
in particular, Linda Brodkey's 1990 imbroglio at UT Austin

comes to mind.
As Karen Welch relates in "Social Issues in First Year

College Writing," in.1989, Brodkey was on the English
committee that designed a writing course asking students to
critically address issues of difference in anti

discrimination lawsuits (par. 5). Yet, as Welch continues,
"other department faculty and some administrators strongly
resisted this proposed course as one that they felt
constituted a liberal political agenda" (par. 5). The
controversy at UT Texas soon garnered national attention,

sparking a controversy in composition and the media "that
continues today about the expediency of including social

and political issues in first-year college writing courses"

(par. 5). Certainly, some compositionists feel that
political issues have no business in the writing classroom.
More recently, the contentious firing of two teaching

assistants from the University of California, San Diego's,
"Dimensions of Culture" writing sequence demonstrates that
politicizing the writing classroom is still a controversial
issue. According to Elizabeth Redden, this program was
originally designed to "challenge hegemonic assumptions
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about race, class, gender, and sexuality" (par. 3). Yet,

the sequence became a source of controversy because the
TA's felt the courses involved had succumbed to "a form of
uncritical patriotic education" (par.3). On the other hand,

the course administrator claimed the program was leaning
towards "political indoctrination" (par.4).

The UCSD incident highlights a typical criticism of
the politicized, and radical, composition classroom. In
their comprehensive bibliography of radical composition,

Bill Thelin and Theresa Grettano cite Maxine Hairston's

1992 critique, "Diversity, Ideology, and Teaching Writing"

(2). Hairston argues against what she sees as a
"problematic trend" (2) in composition: the teaching of

politically complex issues to reveal the ideological
processes embedded in discourses. The dilemma lies in the
potential indoctrination of students to an instructor's
political stance; for Hairston, this is particularly

worrying as writing instructors are not generally

specialists in the field of political theory. Hairston
further■argues that as an instructor is a figure of

authority, his/her political perspective can "stifle or
silence students' voices through intimidation" (2).
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Stanley Fish issues further protest against

politicized teaching in the writing classroom. Thelin and

Grettano restate Fish's opinion in his 2003, "Save the

World on Your Own Time." Responding to student protests
against New School University president's opinion of US

policy in Iraq, Fish insists that universities should
remain neutral in politics (2). By taking a stance on
political issues, Fish claims universities "damage academic
virtue, which he defines as teaching, research and

publishing about . .

. academic matters" (2). For Fish,

political indoctrination is not the business of the

university.
Instructors who attempt to impose political beliefs on
their students contradict and counter the critical
usefulness of radical composition. It is my belief,

however, that Fish et al are mistaken in downplaying its
importance. Since radical composition concerns itself with
how language practices perpetuate and maintain ideology, it

offers students the chance to sharpen their critical

awareness of the world around them. Radical compositionists
need not indoctrinate students into a specific political
realm but help them develop an awareness of the diversity
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of social, cultural, and political worldviews and the power

structures embedded in them.
I suggest, therefore, that a study of the

Habermas/Foucault debate might facilitate this process. As
I indicated at the beginning of this thesis and this

chapter, following Flyvebjerg, a "comparative analysis of

the central ideas of Habermas and Foucault as they pertain

to the question of democracy and civil society" (210) could

present students with the occasion to explore differing
methods of critique in a politicized classroom. Rather than

focusing on a particular political issue, students might be
able to estimate the usefulness of Habermasian and/or
Foucauldian theories of discourse and how they relate to
issues in the public sphere. Perhaps, they might then

relate these ideas to social issues of their own choosing

in order to understand and bring about democratic social
change.
Can Habermas and Foucault be Reconciled?

If the Habermas/Foucault debate offers the politicized
writing classroom an alternative (and perhaps philosophical

approach) to the study of ideology and its effects on text
and discourse, we might then ask if the two philosophers

can be reconciled.
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In his article, "Whose Discourse? A Comparison of

Habermas and Foucault," Stahl compares the discourse
theories of both and argues that the "the most important

correspondence between Habermas and Foucault can thus be
said to be their critical approach, their hope to use their

work to improve the social world" (4334). However, beyond
their critical intentions pertaining to social change,

Stahl points to one view that asserts Habermasian and
Foucauldian theory are so fundamentally different, the best

we might hope for is to "chose a position and avoid the
mistake of mixing up the two" (4334). In the composition

classroom, this choice might be left entirely up to the
students once they have established a knowledge of both
Habermasian and Foucauldian methods of critique. For

instance, perhaps a Habermasian approach to engagement in
the public sphere based on his ideas of communicative
competence and the establishment of rules for debate might

appease participants' sense of fairness and inclusion.
Certainly, the right to participate in the public sphere by

virtue of one's humanness seems the very epitome of

democracy.
However, other students might feel that the playing
field for debate and discussion of social issues in the
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public sphere is not quite level enough to apply Habermas's
rules for engagement. They could base this evaluation on
long perpetuated ideological imbalances in issues such as

race, gender, sexual orientation and so on. These students
could adopt a Foucauldian approach in their investigations

into social issues by conducting their own genealogical
explorations into how certain ideological values and

beliefs are perpetuated.

They could, for instance, explore

why some issues are taboo in the public sphere and why

others are considered palatable for public discussion by
following Foucauldian interest in how "the past concerns

how we have become in the present" (Ashenden and Owen 13).
Certainly, our notions of what is considered appropriate

for public attention are still, as Weisser states,

"ambiguous" (109).

Weisser, rightly, makes much of the often un-level
nature of a public sphere's playing field based on ideas of

what are considered "public" social issues and what are
deemed "private" (109). To illustrate, Weisser, citing

Nancy Fraser, elaborates:
The issue of domestic violence was, until quite

recently, considered to be a private matter
between what was assumed to be a fairly small
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number of heterosexual couples.

Feminists were

in the minority in thinking that "domestic

violence against women was a matter of common
concern and thus a legitimate topic of public

discourse." (qtd. in Weisser 109)
Following Fraser, Weisser asserts that the "the labeling of
some interests as 'public' and others as 'private' is an

ideological'mystification" (109) determined by those in
power who "get to decide what is a public issue and what is
not" (109). As I have shown, the matter of power and who

wields has largely been a Foucauldian concern.
Weisser points out that notions of what is "private"
and what is deemed appropriate for discussion or debate in
the public sphere might stifle students who choose to

express their ideas about issues that are not considered
palatable by "large segments of the population" (108). For

instance, students might not, in the current ideological'
climate, feel comfortable discussing issues concerning

"sexual orientation, spousal and acquaintance abuse, and
other matters of domestic or personal life" (109). Yet,

Weisser insists that teachers in a classroom that focuses

on public writing have a "responsibility to enable students

to discover and write about all of the issues that affect
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their lives" (109). Encouraging students to scrutinize

dominant ideologies would facilitate thi$ process of

enablement. However, as stated earlier, encouraging
critical awareness in a politicized classroom need not be

reduced to an exercise in political indoctrination. The
possibility of indoctrination would be avoided by
encouraging students to decide for themselves exactly what
social or political issues they wish to write about.
Despite his point that one might take either a
Habermasian or Foucauldian approach to democratic

practices—with the attitude that the two approaches are
incommensurable—Stahl posits that their emancipatory
intentions are actually enough to consider ways in which
their ideas can be viewed as complementary (4334).

Subsequently, he suggests that Foucault's approach—namely,
a genealogical one—might amend Habermasian discourse

ethics. In short, Habermasian and Foucauldian theory can be
used together.

If we recall Habermas's insistence on equal
participation in the sphere and the criticism his ideas
have generated, we might remember that utopian-like

consensus by way of an ideal speech situation is improbable

due to power dynamics in discourse. Stahl thus suggests
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that Foucauldian intervention might be useful because "it

sharpens awareness of the non-discursive elements of
discourse" (4334). Stahl asserts that via a "genealogy of

discourses and [the] power constellations that shape them,"

(4334) participants in the public sphere can gain insight
into "understanding and contextualizing validity claims"
(4334). Keeping in mind my above discussion of what is
deemed public concern in the public sphere and what is
considered private, Stahl suggests that a Foucauldian

approach to discourse in the public sphere can "expose
hidden validity claims that have been taken for granted but
that may not be tenable when seen in broad daylight"

(4334) .
By following Stahl's suggestion that we use genealogy
to rout out difference, conflict, and hidden ideological
agendas, we can assume that Foucault's approach foreshadows
that of Roberts, Trimbur, and Ward—particularly, as far as

Trimbur's rhetoric of dissensus is concerned. Unlike
Trimbur, however, we can avoid being stuck between dueling

modern and postmodern paradigms if we make a substantial
amendment to Habermas's vision of consensus in the public
sphere.
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If we take into consideration Trimbur's suggestion
that his students imagine a Habermasian and utopian arena

of perfect consensus, we might then look to Michael Calvin

McGee and John R. Lyne who in fact reject Habermas's ideal
speech situation. They claim that this way of thinking

invites the "nightmare" world of Plato, whereby speech "can
be depersonalized" (397). They maintain the antiHabermasian position that "Habermas .

.

. envisions a kind

of rhetoric that has never existed and in probability

cannot exist" (397).

This "kind of rhetoric" could only

occur if "the ideal speech situation were skillfully

fabricated" (397) and "some standard [were] set, against
which the shortcoming of a real rhetorical interaction
could be assessed" (397). In short, debate would be

contrived and thus potentially standardized in ways that

could merely serve to reenact the status quo.

McGee and

Lyne utterly reject this approach, arguing that in such "an

airy and bloodless world . .

. arguments without attitude

would achieve nothing" (397). With their attitude, McGee

and Lyne echo Foucault's position that grand abstractions

(such as the ideal speech situation) must be scrutinized.
How then might Foucault and Habermas be reconciled if we
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continue to imagine Habermas's notion of universal speech
structures which anticipates emancipatory ideals?

In response to this question, John Brocklesby and
Stephen Cummings cite Flood and Jackson's argument that if

Habermas and Foucault are ultimately to be compatible, "the
Habermasian idea that 'truth' comes about from the force of

a better argument emanating from debate in a 'true' speech

situation is dropped" (752). In short, envisioning the
ideal speech situation as perfect consensus is completely
discarded. Along with Plato's world of ideal forms,

Habermas's ideal speech situation is rejected as a response

to "the Foucauldian idea that no position can ever be
absolutely right, nor can we ever remove the distortions in

peoples' perceptions bought about through power relations"
(752).

While some might think that the rejection of ideals
leaves us with no means by which to measure ethical

behaviour, Brocklesby and Cummings instead claim that a
combination of Habermasian and Foucauldian theory actually

furthers emancipatory thinking. Like Stahl, they maintain
that, for Habermas and Foucault, emancipation is on "both
their 'agendas'" (753). Amending Habermas with Foucauldian
thought, however, ultimately "provides the tools, maps, and
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courage for people in local situations to emancipate their

thinking" (753). According to Brocklesby and Cummings, this
enables an awareness of power and the restrictions ideology
places on the introduction of radical, or innovative, ideas

into the public sphere. In the politicized writing
classroom, therefore, and buoyed by Foucauldian thought,
students might feel freer to put forward ideas that

challenge the status quo, and thus enjoy the freedom to
invent in ways that stimulate the growth of new ideas.

The Habermas/Foucault Debate:
A Lens to Realpolitik

The Tuition Project
What are the implications of the Habermas/Foucault

debate (and what we can learn from it) in a real world
situation? We can get an idea of how the debate offers us a

lens through which we might take a look at real world
situations by way of Rule's account of "The Tuition
Project" in South Africa.

In "Dialogic Spaces: Adult Education Projects and
Social Engagement," Rule addresses the nature of a

discourse community in a specific public sphere--in this

case, a dialogic space set against a backdrop of extreme
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violence: the 1976 Soweto uprising in South Africa (232).
In this space, Rule evokes Habermas's ideal speech
situation but claims'—in a similar manner to Roberts et al

—that whereas Habermas's use of dialogue/communication
"implies a utopian state of being," he "[prefers] to see it

as a process that involves tension and growth; an unfolding
of selves within particular contexts" (326).

Rule demonstrates his experience of a public sphere

set against the backdrop of political turmoil in his
description of "The Tuition Project." The Tuition Project,

established during the Soweto Uprising, was designed to

educate disadvantaged young adults. Rule writes, "the
students were often politicized and at the forefront of the
struggle against apartheid education" (327). Indeed,
apartheid suppressed all forms of' dialogue, not only
between blacks and whites, but between employers and

employees, rich and poor (329). The Tuition Project,
however,

created an environment in which black and white
people could relate to each other in new waysteachers and learners within a learning space.

This encounter challenged the ways ... in which
they typically thought about each other.
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Responses from Tuition Project students in this

regard suggest that not only racial attitudes,
but those associated with class underwent

transformation.

(328)

In order for the Project to function, participants had to

agree to conditions to ensure the dialogic space was
maintained. The conditions were articulated in Habermasian

tones; they included:
A basis of trust (there can be no dialogue

without trust); an attitude of openness towards

learning from one another; a physical space where
participants could meet in relative safety; a

project ethos that encourages participants to
express themselves; and a commitment to solving
problems through meeting, discussion, reflection
and consensus rather than coercion.

(330)

Importantly, however, Rule points out that as well as

forging a safe realm, free from coercion, participants in
the Tuition project studied the power relations inherent
within their particular political context. The project

engaged different discourses, consisting of educators and
committee members—both black and white—and students and

parents from "different regions, social backgrounds, and
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political orientations" (Rule 331). As a result of these
varied discourses, and the troubled setting of the project,
tensions ran extremely high as participants jostled to be

heard and power hierarchies were disrupted. Thus, because

of "educational disruption, political repression, popular
resistance, family breakdown,

[and] violence in many forms,

the dialogue was often one of conflict and contestation"
(Rule 331) .

To complicate matters further, the internal struggles

within the Tuition- Project were juxtaposed against
dialogues, characteristic of political chaos, taking place

outside the project:
The noise from anti-dialogic forms of interaction
. .

. orders, demands, racist insults,

propaganda, stones, bullets, burning tyres,
interrogation and torture-impinged on the project

dialogue.

(331)

Typically, these discourses further exacerbated the

tensions inside the project. So, although Habermasian rules
of engagement attempted to determine the arena for
dialogue, "the dialogue was not without conflict, struggle,

or pain" and adverse power relationships—"informed by

apartheid stereotypes of white and black" (328)—were ever
96

present (330). In an effort to address these conflicts,
Tuition Project educators conducted Foucauldian-like
examinations of power and struggle so as to explicitly

reveal the vast social differences within the Tuition
Project's public sphere. To facilitate social awareness,

these were "articulated and elaborated within the process

of dialogue" (330).
What Rule's project reveals is that the undeniable

facets of competing subjectivities in a politically charged

situation make envisioning the ideal speech situation
almost impossible.

For, as Foucault might point out, it is

impossible to remove ourselves from the power struggles
that take place within specific historical contexts. In

addition, in a politically unstable environment, one
person's idea of rational debate might be very different

from another's.

The best we might hope for then is to

engage in a dialogue committed to exposing and examining

abuses of power-perhaps by way of Foucauldian genealogyrather than one committed to adhering to ideals.
Patricia Bizzell's Cautionary Tale

Like Rule, Bizzell tackles an instance in history
where the public sphere was a site of conflicting and

competing discourses. Her retelling of the 1263 Barcelona
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debate between Jewish sage Nahmanides and Christian convert

Friar Paul Christian extends a cautionary tale to
composition teachers who present public debate as if

"occurs on a rhetorically level playing field" (12). Like
Rule's project, Bizzell shows us some discursive spaces are
never quite as level as we might imagine, and she rejects

the outcome of debates as "emerging from [a] kind of
idealized debate situation" (13). She also reveals that

what constitutes "rationality" within a specific historical

terrain is sometimes not rational at all—at least not in

Habermasian terms. She thus follows Foucault's advice that
rationality, at any point in history, must be subjected to

genealogical scrutiny. This is implied in her in-depth

study of the political and cultural landscape surrounding

the 1263 debate.

Bizzell writes "from the very early days of
Christianity, the new faith defined itself against Judaism"

(15) and in the twelfth century "there was a new urgency to
either persuade Jews to convert or drive them out" (16).
Why? Because a renewed interest in classical thought

intrigued Europe as new knowledge flooded in by way of the
crusades and contact with Muslim culture (16) and "under

[this] influence, thinkers elevated reason as the supreme
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natural attribute" (16). Consequently, religious beliefs
were constantly under scrutiny. As the dominant faith,
therefore, Christianity became "hyper-sensitive" (18) to

the rational analysis of their faith; thus, rationality had
to be "Christianized" (18). The target of Christian
rational persuasion was the Jews for they had been raising,

for some time, the same questions "about Christian

rationality that were now being raised by Christian
thinkers' examination of Christian beliefs" (16). As the
group in power, Christians needed to defend their faith
against Jewish scrutiny of the Bible; they needed to prove,

by "rational" means, that their version of the Bible was

the "right" one for "there was a new desire for uniformity
in the faith community" (16). Bizzell cites several
examples of Christian "rationality" during this period. For

instance, to justify the miracle of Mary's virgin
conception, Christian thinkers explained "that Mary

remained virginal just as a glass is not broken when the

sun shines through it" (17).
Christians called for a public debate with Jewish
leaders because rather than use death threats against the
Jews to make them convert, the new interest in classical

reason prompted Christian eagerness to "persuade them"
99

(19 emphasis in original). The debate was "ardently

supported" (20) by the Christian King of Spain, James of
Aragon; however, as we might suspect, there were several

conditions stipulated as to how the debate would proceed.
As Bizzell states, "the debate was not an open intellectual

engagement between two equal opponents operating under the
same rules" (20); certainly, Jewish participation in such

an event was decidedly dangerous and any hope of "winning"

was out of the question (15). The rules were thus
negotiated that "the Dominicans who caused the disputation
to happen also determined what questions would be

addressed" (20) and the Christian interlocutor, Friar Paul,

"always spoke first and posed questions to Nahmanides whose
responses were restricted to answering those questions

only" (21).
Briefly, therefore, the Christians set out to,

prove from Jewish sources that the Messiah had
already come, that he was both human and divine,
and that he had suffered and died to save

humankind from sin: none of these points is
connected specifically with Jesus in rabbinic

literature, but Paul believed that if he could
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prove all three, Nahmanides would have to admit

that only Jesus fulfilled them all.

(21)

As we can see, as a result of Christian ideas of what
constituted rationality, the odds were stacked against

Nahmanides from the- start. Yet, as Bizzell points out in

her lengthy description of the details of the debate—too
vast in its scope to relate here—Nahmanides argued his

case admirably; he was later awarded a cash prize and the

admiration of the King. However, he did little fo improve

the Jewish lot; for the Christians failed to abandon their
"new missionizing" rhetoric based on their version of
rationality, but rather "continued to refine and employ it"

(27) .
My point here is not to expound upon the details of
the 1263 Disputation, but to emphasize that Bizzell's
purpose, like my own, stresses that interpretations of what

is "rational" appear to change throughout the ages.
Accordingly, Bizzell asks "in what sense does the Barcelona
disputation provide composition instructors with a
cautionary tale?" (28). Answering in Foucauldian tones, she

states "[it] can be considered a cautionary tale about the

limits of rationality" (28). Bizzell's essay is thus a
cautionary tale about what constitutes "truth;" whose
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truths are being adhered to and whose are being muted. It

provides us with a solid example of how reason and
rationality, even in Habermasian tones, must be scrutinized

from a Foucauldian perspective to ensure that muted truths
get a fair hearing on what is not always a level playing
field.

A Final Thought

In a politicized composition classroom--specifically,
one that concerns itself with writing, debate, and
democratic practice in the public sphere--a study of the

Habermas/Foucault debate can reveal that participants will
always have ideological hurdles to overcome, even when the
best intentions attempt to ensure equal participation for

all. As Flyvbjerg states, in matters of public and civil
!

society, the Habermas/Foucault debate indicates the tension

"between the normative and the real, between what should be
done and what is actually done" (210). Habermas's discourse

ethics might seem like the solution to oppressive practices

in our current discursive formation, but as Foucault shows
us, power dynamics are inescapable and ever-present. Thus,

as Habermasian theory takes a constitutional route,

(that

is, it lays down conditions for ideal participation in the
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public sphere), it should still be scrutinized because
"inequality and domination has been built into the concept

of civil society from the start" (211).
As we have seen from Bizzell in particular,

(although

neither Rule or Bizzell refer explicitly to the

Habermas/Foucault debate), discourse in the public sphere
that aims to be rational and reflect the "truth" can be

distorted by historical/contextual forces. These forces

provoke the problems associated with the placement of
conflicting discourses in the public sphere, which, in
turn, demonstrates Weisser's (and Foucault's) point of view
that the playing field for debate is perhaps never quite

level enough to envision Habermas's ideal speech situation.

We might then, taking Brocklesby and Cummings's advice,
leave Habermas's perfect concept of the ideal speech

situation to gather dust in Plato's realm of ideal forms.
Without upholding the ideal speech situation as the

ideal "truth", we could, however, utilize Habermas's rules
for engagement in the public sphere (that is, the freedom
to express one's opinion in a place of safety and, at

least, attempted trust) to emphasize the need for a non-

coercive environment. Then, when power struggles—or those
"private" issues that remain muted by hegemonic practice—
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crop up, we might engage in explicitly-stated Foucauldian,
genealogical activity to determine the roots of the

struggle, or "private-ness" of the issue, perhaps finding
that these roots are themselves the products of conflict.
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